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 On Legal Scholarship: Questions for 
Judge Harry T. Edwards
By Ronald K.L. Collins
[S]ome of the worst eff ects of the problems that I see in legal education [are]: faculty hiring 
that is tilted in favor of “impractical” scholars; inattention to written work, clinical training, and 
ethics; an increasing number of law teachers who hold the profession in disdain; a proliferation of 
legal scholarship that does not aim to serve the profession; and a growing inattention to the needs 
of the disadvantaged.—Harry T. Edwards, May 19, 19971
The life of Judge Harry T. Edwards2 is one very much steeped in writing. 
His passion dates back at least to his years at Uniondale High School when he 
was the editor of the school newspaper. In the legal realm, that passion traces 
back to 1964 and his days on the Michigan Law Review when he published two 
student Notes.3 In the half-century since then, Judge Edwards has authored 
six books and more than 90 scholarly articles or essays.4 As a lawyer, educator, 
administrator, arbitrator, and now jurist, Harry Edwards has put his ideas 
into print concerning an array of subjects. For example, he has written on 
administrative law, affi  rmation action, arbitration, civil rights, federal courts, 
empiricism, federalism, forensic science, higher education law, judging, labor 
law, lawyering, legal education, racial justice, and sex discrimination, among 
other topics.5  
Important as his contributions to the law have been in those areas, what 
sparked the most attention with law professors, judges, and lawyers was his 
Ronald K. L. Collins is the Harold S. Shefelman Scholar at the University of Washington School 
of Law, and an editorial board member of the Journal of Legal Education.
1. A New Vision for the Legal Profession, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 567, 572 (1997), quoting Harry T. Edwards,
Another “Postscript” to “The Growing Distinction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession,” 69
WASH. L. REV. 561, 568-69 (1994).
2. Senior Circuit Judge and Chief Judge emeritus on the United States Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit in Washington, D.C.
3. See his Recent Decisions, Trademarks—Unfair Competition—Scope of Federal Jurisdiction Under Section 43(a) 
of the Lanham Act, 62 MICH. L. REV. 1094 (1964), and his Recent Decisions, Administrative Law—
Rate-Making—Authority of FPC to Limit Rate of Return on Tax Reserves Resulting From Use of Liberalized
Depreciation, 62 MICH. L. REV. 1036 (1964).
4. See Appendix.
5. See Appendix.
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1992 law review article titled The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and 
the Legal Profession.6 That article is said to be one of the most-cited law review 
articles of all time,7 and was the subject of an entire symposium issue in the 
Michigan Law Review.8 Since then, the Judge has continued to write in this fi eld,9 
most recently in a 2014 piece in the Virginia Law Review.10 Not surprisingly, 
Judge Edwards’ latest round of arguments continues to draw praise11 in some 
quarters and critical attention12 in others. 
However one values the Edwards line of argument on law and legal 
scholarship, his thoughts have become, and remain, essential reading 
in the dialogue and debate over the principles and purposes of modern 
scholarship in the legal academy. In one form or another, they have found a 
sympathetic ear among the likes of Chief Justice John Roberts13 and Second 
Circuit Judge Dennis Jacobs,14 among others.15 Even so, others are much 
6. 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992). 
7. See Fred Shapiro & Michelle Pearse, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles of All Time, 110 MICH. L. 
REV. 1483, 1492, 1493, 1501 (2012).
8. See Symposium, Legal Education, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1921 (1993).
9. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies That Attempt 
to Understand the Factors Aff ecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895 (2009); Harry T. 
Edwards, Refl ections (On Law Review, Legal Education, Law Practice, and My Alma Mater), 100 MICH. 
L. REV. 1999 (2002); Harry T. Edwards, A New Vision, supra note 1; Harry T. Edwards, Another 
“Postscript,” supra note 1 (1994); and Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal 
Education and the Legal Profession: A Postscript, 91 MICH. L. REV. 2191 (1993).
10. Harry T. Edwards,  Another Look at Professor Rodell’s “Goodbye to Law Reviews,” 100 VA. L. REV. 1483 
(2014). 
11. See, e.g., Richard G. Kopf, The Value of Law Reviews to Judges, HERCULES & THE UMPIRE, Dec. 
18, 2014, http://herculesandtheumpire.com/tag/editorial-partnership-between-law-review-
editors-and-judges/. 
12. See, e.g., Michael Dorf, Judge Harry Edwards Is Still Unimpressed With Legal Scholarship, DORF ON 
LAW, Dec. 15, 2014, http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2014/12/judge-harry-edwards-is-still.html; 
and Paul Caron, Judge Edwards on Rodell’s “Goodbye to Law Reviews,” TAXPROFBLOG, Dec. 20, 
2014, http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2014/12/judge-edwards-on-rodells-.html. 
13. See Adam Liptak, Keep the Briefs Brief, Literary Justices Advise, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2011, quoting 
Chief Justice Roberts (“What the academy is doing, as far as I can tell,” Chief Justice John 
G. Roberts Jr. said in 2011, “is largely of no use or interest to people who actually practice 
law.”).
14. See Brent E. Newton, Law Review Scholarship in the Eyes of the Twenty-First Century Supreme Court 
Justices: An Empirical Analysis, 4 DREXEL L. REV. 399, 415-416 (2012), quoting Judge Jacobs (“I 
haven’t opened up a law review in years. . . . No one speaks of them.  No one relies on 
them.”).
15. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, When Rendering Decisions, Judges Are Finding Law Reviews Irrelevant, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 19, 2007; and Adam Liptak, The Lackluster Reviews That Lawyers Love to Hate, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 21, 2013. 
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less sympathetic,16 while still others both agree and disagree with him in part.17 
The upshot? Judge his views as you will; term them too fi xed or too fl uid; or 
commend or condemn them. It is, nonetheless, a fact: Judge Edwards’ article 
“certainly hit a nerve.”18 
If works such as Holmes’ The Path of the Law19 have taught those of us in 
the legal academy anything, it is this: Provocative propositions and unsettling 
arguments should, when thoughtfully advanced, prompt us to pause and 
rethink how we size up life and law. After all, one does not have to be a 
convert to an argument to feel the sting of its truth. By that measure, and 
for that reason, among others, I invited Judge Edwards to reply to a set of 
questions—some autobiographical, others analytical—about legal scholarship. 
He graciously agreed, and his responses to most of them are set out below.  

Edwards: I want to make it clear at the outset that some of my answers 
to the questions posed below have been drawn directly from some 
of my earlier works. I cannot improve much on what I said in those 
articles, so I have not tried. Indeed, I prefer not to have anything 
published that will detract from what I tried to say in those pieces. 
Collins: Your legal scholarship writing goes back more than a half-
century to your days on the law review at the University of Michigan 
Law School. And you began writing books nearly four decades ago. 
Today you continue to till these fi elds while turning out judicial 
opinions. Why? What is it about legal writing that so impassions you? 
Edwards: I have always enjoyed writing. As a young boy, I used 
to write stories for my personal amusement. In high school I was 
the editor of the school newspaper. And the vast majority of my 
undergraduate courses at Cornell University involved heavy writing 
16. See, e.g., Louis H. Pollak, The Disjunction Between Judge Edwards and Professor Priest, 91 MICH. L. 
REV. 2113 (1993); Paul Brest, Plus ça Change, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1945 (1993); and Kevin M. 
Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Judge Harry Edwards: A Case in Point, 80 WASH. U. L. Q. 1275 
(2002).
17. See, e.g., James J. White, Letter to Judge Harry Edwards, 91 MICH. L. REV. 2177 (1993). Consider 
also Professor Stephen Vladeck’s comments: “Whether or not we agree with this sentiment, 
the salient issue to those who fi nd this trend disturbing must be whether our scholarship 
is both accessible to judges and applicable to the disputes before them. Thus, I fi nd 
the suggestion that at least some legal scholarship should aspire to be useful to judges 
entirely unobjectionable, and the complaint that it isn’t doing so one that merits sustained 
refl ection.” Stephen Vladeck, The Law Reviews vs. the Courts: Two Thoughts From the Ivory Tower, 39 
CONNTEMPLATIONS 1, 2 (2007) (citations omitted).
18. NEIL DUXBURY, JURISTS AND JUDGES: AN ESSAY ON INFLUENCE 44 (2001). See also 
Richard Brust, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1, 2012,  http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/
the_high_bench_vs._the_ivory_tower/. 
19. 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).
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requirements. When I attended law school, I was required to learn a 
new style of writing, which I found to be intriguing. 
In my view, “legal writing” at its best is precise, carefully reasoned, 
and well-supported (by both facts and governing principles). It should 
not be meandering, pointless, frivolous, or pedantic. It is wonderfully 
challenging because, often, your aim is to address a diffi  cult issue and 
convince others to understand and embrace the view that you are 
espousing. I enjoy every facet of writing—the thought and research 
that precedes the actual writing; the task of organizing your thoughts; 
the work involved in drafting your position; and, fi nally, the important 
chore of editing for clarity and accuracy. I never want anyone to be 
confused about what I have written, even when they may disagree 
with what I have to say. 
Writing always has been my preferred method of communication. 
People can distort anything that you have to say, whether written or 
spoken, but you are better able to defend a position in retrospect if it 
is committed to writing. This puts pressure on you, however, to write 
with precision and clarity. I enjoy the challenge.
Collins: You have written some 15 articles or essays that pertain to one 
aspect or another of race and the law. Why? What drew you to that 
topic? 
Edwards: Matters having to do with “race and the law” have consumed 
society during my lifetime. Our country has struggled with issues of 
race discrimination in employment, voting, education, and criminal 
justice; racial stereotyping in all walks of life; and profound disputes 
over preferential remedies and affi  rmative action to cure the lasting 
eff ects of race bias. I felt the eff ects of race bias when I was growing 
up, and I certainly experienced it fi rsthand when I was in law school. 
The interesting question is not why I was drawn to write about some 
of these subjects, but why I did not write more. 
When I was an undergraduate student at Cornell University, there 
were only a handful of African American students at the school. Across 
the country the few “Negroes” who attended the elite, predominantly 
white schools often were seen as “diff erent,” both from white students 
and from other blacks. Indeed, I heard this from a number of my 
undergraduate classmates. I was viewed as having “made it” despite 
my race. I was told that I was the exception to whom the stereotype 
of inferiority did not apply. It was quite bizarre to listen to comments 
such as these, and it was a challenge to overcome the not-so-subtle 
racist digs.
When I entered the University of Michigan Law School in 1962, 
I was the only African American in my class. I graduated very high 
in my law school class, earning a number of honors for academic 
achievement. Nevertheless, when I fi nished law school, many major 
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law fi rms to which I applied for jobs rejected me. I was told quite 
frankly by some of the hiring partners that, despite my strong academic 
record, the fi rms would not hire a Negro. It was only when my white 
mentor, Michigan law Professor Russell Smith, pressed on my behalf 
that I received a job off er from a major Chicago law fi rm. 
In 1969 and 1970, students at the University of Michigan engaged 
in protests and demanded that the law school hire a black faculty 
member. It was because of these protests that I was recruited to teach 
at Michigan in 1970. In 1975, I was invited to join the faculty at Harvard 
Law School under similar circumstances. In 1977, I was appointed to 
the Board of Directors of Amtrak, where I later was elected Chairman, 
because President Carter was determined to give qualifi ed African 
Americans access to high government positions. And in 1980, I was 
appointed to the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, 
in part because the Carter administration was determined to put more 
qualifi ed African Americans on the bench. 
So why did I not opt to write even more than I did on “race and the 
law?” Part of the answer is that, when I fi rst joined the legal academy, 
African American scholars faced the great risk of being marginalized 
and discredited if we focused on subjects having to do with race and 
the law. There were very few minority law professors in those days, 
and many were hired only grudgingly. So it mattered—to us, to the 
students who saw us as role models, and to the institutional integrity 
of the schools at which we taught—that we succeed in the legal 
academy. At least in those early days, I and other African American 
legal scholars had the clear sense that we should teach and write about 
mainstream subjects in order to be taken seriously. As it turned out for 
me, I focused on my areas of specialty (labor and employment law, 
collective bargaining, negotiation, and higher education law), which 
I enjoyed immensely. 
I wrote, as did many other minority scholars, on “race and the law” 
issues, even as we specialized in other subjects. It was impossible to 
ignore the issues that sometimes seemed intractable. Because of our 
life experiences, many African American scholars have something to say 
about “race and the law,” even if our principal teaching and scholarly 
work is in other areas. 
It was not until 2004, however, in The Journey from Brown v. Board of 
Education to Grutter v. Bollinger: From Racial Assimilation to Diversity, that 
I seriously attempted to draw on my own personal and professional 
experiences to refl ect on racial equality and inequality in the 
United States and ponder the consequences of the shift from racial 
assimilation to diversity as a means of achieving racial equality. This 
was a particularly rewarding project because my son, Brent Edwards, 
who is a professor of comparative literature at Columbia University, 
collaborated with me on a piece of it.
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Fortunately, we have reached a point in the legal academy where 
many law professors—female, male, minority, and nonminority—focus 
on race and the law and other civil rights issues in their teaching and 
scholarship.
Collins: Since 1979 you have written some 17 articles on the legal 
profession, the legal academy, and the relationship between the two. 
Again, why? And what drew you to that topic? 
Edwards: I joined the bench in 1980. Before my appointment, I had 
gained signifi cant experience as a practicing lawyer and as a member 
of the legal academy: I had practiced law for fi ve years in Chicago 
with a major law fi rm, taught law at the University of Michigan and 
Harvard Law School (earning tenure at both schools), served for a 
decade as a neutral labor arbitrator, and published several books and 
numerous articles. My appointment to the D.C. Circuit aff orded me an 
opportunity to think seriously about the work of the legal profession 
and the legal academy, and, in particular, the relationship between the 
two. 
I have always taught while serving on the bench—it has been 
enriching because my work as a judge enhances my teaching, and 
vice versa. After more than a decade on the bench, however, I was 
dismayed with some of what I was seeing in the legal profession and 
in the legal academy. I gave vent to my concerns when I published 
The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession. My 
general thesis was this:
I have been deeply concerned about the growing disjunction 
between legal education and the legal profession. I fear that our law 
schools and law fi rms are moving in opposite directions. The schools 
should be training ethical practitioners and producing scholarship 
that judges, legislators, and practitioners can use. The fi rms should 
be ensuring that associates and partners practice law in an ethical 
manner. But many law schools—especially the so-called “elite” 
ones—have abandoned their proper place, by emphasizing abstract 
theory at the expense of practical scholarship and pedagogy. Many 
law fi rms have also abandoned their place, by pursuing profi t above 
all else. While the schools are moving toward pure theory, the fi rms 
are moving toward pure commerce, and the middle ground—ethical 
practice—has been deserted by both.
The reactions from the bench, bar, and academy were more than 
anything I ever anticipated. One of my former colleagues at the 
University of Michigan Law School, who will remain unnamed, sent 
me a funny and poignant letter which said something like: “Obviously, 
you hit a nerve. And what is so amusing is that the members of the 
academy cannot simply dismiss your critique because you are a 
member of the academy and know what goes on in our ranks.” The 
Disjunction piece was cited in Fred Shapiro and Michelle Pearse’s The 
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Most-Cited Law Review Articles of All Time, so I guess that more than a few 
people have read it. I have been gratifi ed—even to see some of the 
critical commentary that the article has drawn—because I know that at 
least some members of the academy and legal profession are focused 
on the issues. I have continued to write on this subject because I feel 
that it is incredibly important, and there are still issues to be resolved. 
Collins: Nearly a quarter-century ago, you observed: “I fear that our 
law schools and law fi rms are moving in opposite directions.” And 
in a 1997 speech published in the New York University Law Review, you 
quoted from a December 23, 1992, letter the late Charles Alan Wright 
sent you, wherein he wrote: “Legal education is moving away from the 
needs of the legal profession, it is doing so at an increasing pace, and 
this is a great loss.”20 Has the situation improved in any meaningful 
way since then or is it worse? 
Edwards: There are still many serious problems that we are facing 
in the legal academy and the legal profession. The problems are 
somewhat diff erent from the problems that I discussed in 1992, but 
they are no less signifi cant. 
There are still law professors who express disdain for the practice 
of law, and off er no concrete proposals for reform. In my view, this is 
unacceptable. In constructing a vision of legal education, I agree with 
Professor J.B. White, who once wrote that, in order for legal academic 
work “to be of value to the law it is essential that the work in question 
express interest in, and respect for, the possibilities of what lawyers . . . 
do.”21 This means that a good body of legal scholarship must address 
law’s purpose of serving society. Not all legal scholarship, but a good 
body of it.
There are a number of skeptics who see legal education as a failing 
enterprise. Professor Brian Tamanaha recently wrote that “[v]olumes 
of material are being written by law professors that appear to leave 
little or no trace . . . . Riding one intellectual fad after another, law 
professors are spinning wheels going nowhere.”22 Professor Tamanaha 
says that this is because law professors have “no obligation to produce 
scholarship that is useful for judges and lawyers—although law 
professors are best positioned, with subject matter expertise and the 
luxury of time, to provide this essential service to the legal system. 
Most professors in most academic fi elds, like law professors, write for 
each other.”23 This is a harsh critique, but hardly unfounded.
20. A New Vision, supra note 1, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. at  568 (1997), quoting from letter from Charles Alan 
Wright to Harry T. Edwards 1 (Dec. 23, 1992) (on fi le with author).
21. JAMES BOYD WHITE, FROM EXPECTATION TO EXPERIENCE: ESSAYS ON LAW AND LEGAL 
EDUCATION 51 (2000). 
22. BRIAN TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS 56 (2012).
23. Id. at 57.
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Beyond the ongoing debates over legal scholarship, law schools are 
now also facing a number of critics who question the value of legal 
education and suggest that major reforms are necessary. And law 
school applications are down, in part due to the economic crisis in 
the legal profession. These realities have caused some law schools to 
overhaul their curriculums or take innovative steps to make course 
off erings more relevant to the needs of the profession. 
Some of the steps taken have been for the better. For example, law 
schools have made signifi cant investments in expanding their clinical 
off erings—and not just off ering more options, but making clinics 
useful, productive, and educational. Good clinical instruction is 
diffi  cult and expensive, so it is encouraging to see the genuine eff orts 
made by a number of law schools to improve their clinical off erings.
We have also seen some sustained interest in legal education reforms 
encompassing a broad range of strategies and proposals. For example, 
more and more academics and practitioners have suggested reforming 
the third year of law school by having students focus on experiential 
learning and/or major research and writing projects. Recently, several 
professors at Harvard Law School conducted a survey of law fi rm 
practitioners to determine what business courses should be off ered 
to law students to better prepare them for law practice. It is unclear 
whether any of the current ideas for curriculum reforms will be adopted 
in the legal academy. It is encouraging, however, that members of the 
academy and the profession are at least addressing some of the serious 
issues that now face legal education. 
I continue to be optimistic in my outlook, possibly because I 
cherish the best ideals of the legal academy and the legal profession. I 
am unwilling to believe that we will not fi x the problems that we now 
face in legal education and the profession. Democracy in the United 
States depends upon our commitment to the rule of law, and good 
legal education helps to ensure that our commitment never wavers. 
Members of the legal academy certainly have the capacity, and 
hopefully the vision, to embrace whatever reforms may be necessary 
to achieve and maintain excellence in legal education.
Collins: Few of the so-called “better” law schools hire applicants 
who have had more than a couple of years in practice, if that. As you 
know, today the typical profi le in such schools is an applicant with 
Ivy League credentials and a federal appellate clerkship . . . and a 
PhD if possible. All such applicants often lack any meaningful and 
sustained experience in the practice of law. What connection, if any, 
do you think that has to the problems you see in legal education and 
scholarship?
Edwards: Over the past two decades, a number of preeminent law 
schools have placed a premium on abstract scholarship and aimless 
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empirical studies, even though members of the legal academy have 
reason to know that much of this work is not useful to most practicing 
lawyers, legislators, judges, and regulators who employ the law to 
promote societal well-being. Bright, young lawyers who are seeking to 
enter the academy know that this is the type of scholarship that they 
must produce in order to be given serious consideration for teaching 
positions at a number of law schools. The more obscure the better, it 
sometimes seems. 
There is certainly value in some abstract scholarship. I have never 
doubted this. But it should not be preferred over other forms of 
scholarship. In order for legal scholarship to be relevant outside the 
legal academy, law professors should balance abstract scholarship 
with scholarly works that are of interest and use to lawyers, legislators, 
judges, and regulators who serve society through legal arguments, 
decision-making, regulatory initiatives, and enforcement actions. In 
other words, law schools, law reviews, and legal scholars should do a 
better job in producing scholarship that is of interest and use to wider 
audiences in society. This means that law schools must hire young 
scholars who are interested in doing such work, and then value their 
eff orts.
In addition, because young scholars are discouraged from spending 
any serious time in practice, many know little about the real world of 
lawyering. A sampling of tenure-track professors hired during the past 
decade at forty law schools found that the median professor had three 
years’ practice experience. Law schools are also hiring an increasing 
number of professors who have PhDs in other fi elds. This is not a bad 
development, unless PhDs come in droves and uniformly spurn any 
interest in the law and in the issues facing the legal profession.
Unless law schools ensure that their faculties refl ect a real balance 
of talent—i.e., including professors with strengths in both concrete 
and abstract scholarship and teaching—the current gulf between the 
profession and the academy will continue to grow and become even 
more distressing.
Collins: On a related front, in your 2014 Virginia Law Review article 
you wrote: “My guess is that we will see no signifi cant change in the 
content of what is published in the law reviews unless the law schools 
change their ways.”24 Might you elaborate a bit more on that for our 
readers?
Edwards: Law review editors have come to understand the law 
schools’ preferences for obscure philosophical and theory-laden 
material, in part because they have received so many articles of this 
stripe in recent years. And the law reviews have accommodated these 
forms of scholarship, largely without protest. 
24. Another Look, supra note 10, 100 VA. L. REV. at 1509. 
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I do not blame the law reviews for law schools’ preferences in favor 
of abstract philosophical, theoretical, and empirical scholars and 
scholarship; nor do I blame the law reviews for the academy’s seeming 
disdain for scholarship that focuses on issues related to professional 
practice, procedure, doctrine, regulation, and legislation that would be 
of more interest and greater use to wider audiences. The reviews really do 
not have the leverage to change how law schools operate. The law reviews 
will change their publication practices when the law schools signal that 
they have a serious interest in scholarship related to professional practice, 
procedure, doctrine, regulation, and legislation —i.e., scholarship beyond 
just abstract philosophical, theoretical, and aimless empirical scholarship.
Collins: Professor Pierre Schlag has asserted: “I think [what] 
we need to talk about is whether or not the sort of extraordinarily 
refi ned doctrinal approach that someone like Judge Harry Edwards 
champions is producing anything of value.”  He then added: “Is 
it producing anything of value in the academy and is it producing 
anything of value in the law? That is, what do we have to show for all 
this doctrinal complexity apart from a massive piling on of transaction 
costs? Is there anything to show for it?”25 What is your response to 
that?
Edwards: Read my article in Another Look at Professor Rodell’s “Goodbye to Law 
Reviews.”26 Two additional points are worth mentioning here. First, law 
professors have to do more than just write for a few of their academic 
colleagues. This self-indulgent approach hardly serves the needs of 
the profession or society at large. Second, it is shortsighted, to say the 
least, to characterize my thesis as an “extraordinarily refi ned doctrinal 
approach.” 
Seeking a balance between abstract scholarship and scholarship 
founded on doctrine and theory is not an endorsement of unnecessary 
and burdensome doctrinal complexity. Ideally, good doctrine/
theory-focused legal scholarship brings clarity and order, not simply 
“complexity,” to our systems of justice and the rule of law.
Collins: Turning to what Judge Richard Posner said in his book 
Overcoming Law, he wrote: “The most interesting questions raised by 
Edwards’ article is whether the shift in the emphasis in legal scholarship 
at the leading law schools from the practical to the theoretical has caused 
a net decline in the social value of legal scholarship.”27 Moreover, he 
charged that you are “convinced . . . [that] interdisciplinary scholarship 
25. Id. 
26. Supra note 10. 
27. RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 96-97 (1995).
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[is] useless to the legal profession . . . .”28 He also suggested that you 
overlooked the value of various kinds of interdisciplinary scholarship: 
“He does not discuss [scholarship such as] the criticisms that 
Bayesian probability theorists and cognitive psychologists have 
made on the rules of evidence, jury instructions, and the burden of 
proof . . . .”
“He does not discuss [scholarship such as] the impact of feminist 
jurisprudence on rape law, sexual harassment, and the debate over 
the legal protection of pornography. (He does not mention feminist 
legal writing at all.)”
“He ignores the important role that political scientists play as 
expert witnesses in reapportionment litigation.”
“And he is silent on the growing literature, which is informed 
by philosophy and literary theory and also by political theory, 
economics, and the theory of public choice, on the interpretation of 
constitutions and statutes, even though interpretation is the major 
function of the court on which Judge Edwards sits.” 
How would you respond to Judge Posner?
Edwards: Judge Posner’s critique fails to capture my position. Read 
my article Another Look at Professor Rodell’s “Goodbye to Law Reviews.”29 Most 
of the matters that he mentions are addressed in the Virginia Law Review 
essay.
Collins: In Overcoming Law Judge Posner also asked: “[W]here is it 
written that all legal scholarship shall be in the service of the legal 
profession? Perhaps the ultimate criterion of all scholarship is 
utility, but it need not be utility to a particular audience, or even to a 
contemporary audience.”30 
In a 2004 interview with Washington University Law School’s Dean 
Joel Seligman, you stated: “I . . . believe that there are still too many 
legal scholars who tend to discuss material from non-law disciplines 
without situating it in a meaningful legal context. I think that some of 
this is attributable to a misguided sense of intellectual superiority.”31 
Are these two views compatible or not? 
Edwards: Unless Judge Posner means to say that law schools are not 
professional schools, with a principal mission of educating students to 
enter the legal profession, then I see no incompatibility with the two 
statements. And I have never said that “all legal scholarship shall be in 
28. Id. at 96. 
29. Supra note 10. 
30. OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 38, at 99.
31. Access to Justice: The Social Responsibility of Lawyers: A Conversation with Judge Harry T. Edwards, 16 
WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 61, 73 (2004). 
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the service of the legal profession.” That strikes me as a fundamentally 
silly assertion. 
Collins: In a 2012 article published in the Northwestern University Law 
Review, Professors Lee Petherbridge and David L. Schwartz conducted 
empirical research on the use of scholarly articles by Supreme Court 
Justices in their published opinions. Among other things, the authors 
found that Chief Justice John Roberts used “legal scholarship in about 
a quarter (23.08%) of the opinions he authored” through 2010. “That 
rate,” Petherbridge and Schwartz added, “does not diff er signifi cantly 
from the rates of the other current Justices.”32
What do you make of those fi ndings? Do you think they undermine 
the critique against the uses and values of contemporary legal 
scholarship? 
Edwards: I do not make anything of the fi ndings. Do the authors tell 
us anything about how the articles are used? Do they tell us how many 
of the articles are repeat citations? Do we know what percentage of all 
published law review articles are cited by the Court? I suspect that the 
percentage is quite low. 
Actually, I would be more impressed by a study of Court of Appeals 
opinions because we decide so many more cases each year than the 
Supreme Court. My sense is that my colleagues and I do not often rely 
on law review articles in writing our published opinions. For the year 
ending December 31, 2013, the Courts of Appeals terminated almost 
35,126 cases on the merits. About 12% of the terminations on the merits 
were by published written decision. How many of these dispositions 
relied on law review articles? 
Collins: By and large, law professors write all or most of the scholarly 
work they publish, whereas judicial law clerks (recent law grads, 
almost all of whom were law review editors) write the lion’s share of 
the opinions published by appellate judges. Do you think the quality 
of judicial opinions is diminished because of the latter? 
Edwards: The premises underlying the question are misguided. What 
valid study shows that “judicial law clerks (recent law grads, almost all 
of whom were law review editors) write the lion’s share of the opinions 
published by appellate judges”? This has not been my experience and 
I have not seen it to be true with my judicial colleagues. No one doubts 
that good law clerks can be invaluable to a judge in assisting with legal 
research and drafting. But drafts produced by law clerks should not 
be confused with the opinions issued by the judges. My colleagues 
and I are responsible for and attend to the writing of any opinion 
that leaves chambers. The suggestion that my law clerks do the “lion’s 
share” of my work is ridiculous. The truth is that no matter how bright 
32. Id. 
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they may be, most law clerks do not have either the knowledge or 
experience to shoulder the “lion’s share” of the decision-making and 
opinion-writing responsibilities assigned to their judges.
And what valid study shows that “law professors write all or most 
of the scholarly work they publish”? During my 45 years as a law 
professor, I have known of more than a few situations when research 
assistants and/or law review editors have crafted large chunks of the 
drafts of articles published by law professors. 
Collins: Today, there are more than 1,600 legal journals published in 
the United States alone, and some are released as many as eight times 
annually. As you know, many law schools have multiple journals (e.g., 
Yale Law School has 11). And then there are online repositories (e.g., 
SSRN and Digital Commons). In 1997 it was estimated that American 
law reviews turned out 150,000 to 190,000 pages annually.
Are too many schools publishing too many articles? If so, what do 
you propose?
Edwards: I would not propose doing anything. I understand that 
the range of merit in law review publications is enormous because 
there are so many law schools and law journals, talent is not evenly 
distributed, and article selection and editing processes vary widely. 
And the proliferation of law journals has undoubtedly resulted in an 
increase in the publication of articles of little value. But I am not sure 
why this should bother anyone. Law reviews are not universally bad, 
nor are the articles that they publish universally uninteresting and 
useless. So long as researchers can fi nd the good works, it does not 
much matter that there are many articles that are left unread.
I have already indicated that, in my view, relatively few law review 
articles are cited in judicial opinions. This is not necessarily a valid 
measure of the value of law reviews, however. Good articles are 
potentially useful to anyone who reads them, whether or not they are 
cited. And, as I note below, law review publications can serve purposes 
beyond having an impact on judicial decision making.
Some critics suggest that law reviews have little infl uence in the 
legal community in part because their circulation numbers are low. I 
think this is a shortsighted view. First, law review articles can easily be 
read online, so print subscriptions are a poor measure of readership. 
Furthermore, even if most law journal articles are not widely read, 
law reviews nonetheless have educational value: Law professors who 
publish their writings often pursue research that supports their law 
teaching, and these professors may also use their published works to 
supplement class assignments. And students who serve on law reviews 
are aff orded opportunities to produce notes and comments on a variety 
of legal issues and to gain experience in editing. Whatever we may 
think of law reviews, I strongly disagree with critics who claim that we 
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should simply abolish journals as they currently exist. Throwing the 
baby out with the bath water is not a viable solution.
Collins: In a 2014 interview posted on the Concurring Opinions blog, 
Judge Posner declared: “The domination of academic law journal 
publication by students is a scandal.”33 Do you agree? If so, what do 
you recommend? 
Edwards: The most signifi cant problem with student editors is their 
limited ability to select articles for publication after having had only two 
years of legal education. Many students have low knowledge depth, 
for want of experience, and the capabilities of individual students 
vary considerably. And to the extent that specialized knowledge and 
editorial experience confer unique effi  ciencies, these are effi  ciencies 
that most student-run publications cannot capture. 
These are formidable obstacles that have warped the article-selection 
and editing processes and promoted the publication of articles that 
are of little use to the bar, bench, legislatures, and regulatory bodies. 
Student editors generally are not innovators. They stick with the style 
rules that have been handed down to them. Editors who might have 
the talent to develop new and more appealing protocols for their 
journals do not have the time to pursue their ideas, nor generally the 
incentive. They are full-time students who serve as editors for no more 
than twelve months. There is no simple solution, however, because 
law faculty members generally are unwilling to shoulder the burdens 
now carried by student editors. 
Reforms may be possible, however. Apparently, there are some 
law journals that have tried to involve law professors in their article-
selection process to gain the benefi t of the professors’ expertise and 
experience in assessing articles that student editors are not easily able 
to evaluate. There are some pitfalls to these approaches, however, 
because professors do not always have the time or interest to undertake 
such reviews. And unregulated “peer review” is not always an ideal 
system to assess articles that have been submitted for publication. 
So where do we stand? It is unclear. Over the years, I have had 
the good fortune to work with some truly outstanding student law 
review editors. The truth is that the quality of work done by law 
review editorial boards varies from year to year, depending upon 
the leadership abilities, intellectual talents, and dedication of the 
individual editors. The best of the student editors are sterling in their 
work and should be commended. 
33. Ronald K.L. Collins, On legal education & legal scholarship—More questions for Judge Posner, 
Concurring Opinions blog, Dec. 8, 2014, http://concurringopinions.com/archives/2014/12/
on-legal-education-legal-scholarship-more-questions-for-judge-posner.html. 
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Collins: In writing the foreword to the 2009 Michigan Law Review book 
issue, Dean Erwin Chemerinsky wrote: “I knew that writing that 
impressed other academics was the key to advancing in my chosen 
profession—pleasing those within my institution, opening the door to 
moving to other schools, and fostering my reputation so that I would 
receive recognition such as being invited to speak at conferences and 
being thought well of by my peers in academia.”34 
He added: “As I observe my more junior colleagues, I realize that 
they are far more sophisticated than I was in working toward these 
goals. They spend far more time than I did in making strategic choices 
about topics that will lead to prominent placements and taking actions 
to gain recognition. They focus much more than I ever did on the 
hierarchy of law reviews and trying to draw fi ne distinctions among 
them in deciding where to publish.”35 
What do you make of that?
Edwards: I largely agree with Dean Chemerinsky’s comment.
Collins: If I may draw once more on something from what Dean 
Chemerinsky wrote in his foreword to the book review issue of the 
Michigan Law Review: “Why should law schools require and encourage 
scholarship, and what types of writings deserve recognition?”36 How 
would you respond to that question? 
Edwards: Legal education and good scholarship are inexorably 
linked. Superior scholarship advances knowledge, tests our thinking, 
encourages better decision making by public offi  cials, leads to reforms 
that serve the public good, improves teaching, and enriches our 
understanding of history. Therefore, law schools should require and 
encourage scholarship. Law schools, however, should remain open to 
and respectful of diverse forms of scholarship to achieve the salutary 
goals of education.
Collins: Writing in Dorf on Law, Professor Michael Dorf declared: “The 
Growing Disjunction was a cri de coeur of an old guard.”37 Moreover, he 
added: “[T]he complaints of Judge Edwards, Justice Breyer, Chief 
Justice Roberts, and the other critics of legal scholarship rest on 
nothing more than an occasional perusal of the covers of law reviews. 
There may well be problems with legal scholarship. But the judicial 
critics have not made any kind of a case. At most, they’ve sent a signal 
to legal scholars that if they want to infl uence judges, they should title 
34. Foreword: Why Write? 107 MICH. L. REV. 881, 881 (2009).
35. Id.  
36. Id. at 882. 
37. Judge Harry Edwards Is Still Unimpressed, supra note 11.   
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their articles something like ‘An Article That Is Super-Duper Helpful 
to Judges.’”38 Your response? 
Edwards: Respectfully, Professor Dorf appears to have missed the 
point. I cannot speak for others, but the point that I have tried to make 
over the past twenty-three years is that legal scholarship and teaching 
should be balanced to accommodate the needs of the profession as a 
whole (not just judges), law students, other legal scholars, and society. 
I have consistently espoused the view that theoretical scholarship is 
undoubtedly valuable, but that there must be a balance between theory 
and concrete applications of the law. Indeed, I have explained that I do 
not doubt for a moment the importance of theory in legal scholarship, 
because good scholarship routinely integrates theory with doctrine. 
I have also explained that I am not opposed to intensely theoretical 
scholarship that does not purport to have any practical value so long 
as other scholars are not discouraged from producing work that is of 
greater interest and use to wide audiences. Legal scholarship should 
include a healthy balance of theory, practice, procedure, policy, and 
doctrine. How can this be objectionable? 
Collins: Much of legal scholarship is court-centric. Often ignored is 
litigation scholarship, namely, scholarship focusing on how trial and 
appellate lawyers actually litigate cases. Do you think this problem 
(assuming you see it as one) has anything to do with how law is taught 
in most law schools? 
Edwards: Scholarship and teaching focused on eff ective techniques 
of trial and appellate advocacy are important. They should be a part 
of every law school’s curriculum and scholarly output. However, it is 
very diffi  cult to produce good scholarship focusing on how trial and 
appellate lawyers actually litigate particular cases. “True scholarship 
consists in knowing not what things exist, but what they mean; it is 
not memory but judgment.”39 It is too easy to fall into the trap of 
“storytelling” when writing about how lawyers litigate particular cases. 
Individual cases are often sui generis, so what fl ows from the case may 
not be generalizable. On the other hand, there are certain landmark 
cases—Korematsu v. United States, Brown v. Board of Education, Roe v. Wade, 
Bush v. Gore, Lawrence v. Texas, and Obergefell. v. Hodges—that are indelible 
pieces of American history. We learn from history, both our mistakes 
and our triumphs. So it certainly would make sense to encourage 
scholarship that focuses on how trial and appellate lawyers litigated 
landmark cases.40
38. Id. 
39. Quoted in Ferris Greenslet, JAMES RUSSELL LOWELL: HIS LIFE AND WORK 130 (1905).
40. See Ronald K.L. Collins, Litigation Scholarship (unpublished manuscript, June 7, 2015, on fi le 
with the author).
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Collins: You have portrayed the legal treatise as “[t]he paradigm of 
‘practical’ legal scholarship.”41 That said, are we witnessing a decline 
in interest when it comes to using legal treatises? It seems that the 
glorious days of the likes of treatise writers such as Blackstone, Kent, 
Story, Corbin, Wigmore, and K.C. Davis are no more. And Angela 
Fernandez and Markus Dubber maintain that “few if any legal scholars 
in the United States today wake up fi lled with a burning desire to 
devote their professional lives to the production of a treatise.”42
In that regard, in an April 29, 2005, letter to Justice Stephen 
Breyer, Professor Laurence Tribe wrote: “[I came] to the sobering 
realization that no treatise, in my sense of that term, can be true to this 
moment in our constitutional history—to its confl icts, innovations, 
and complexities.”  He also added: “I do not have, nor do I believe 
I have seen, a vision capacious and convincing enough to propound 
as an organizing principle for the next phase in the law of our 
Constitution.”43
Are treatises becoming the dinosaurs of legal scholarship? Have 
electronic search engines eclipsed them? 
Edwards: There are a few outstanding treatises that are still very much 
in use in law practice and in judicial chambers. And some of these 
treatises can be searched online. However, it is true that legal scholars 
are no longer encouraged to produce legal treatises. It is a dying form 
of legal scholarship.
Collins: With increasing frequency, blogging seems to be trumping 
law review publications for any variety of reasons. I am thinking of 
blogs such as SCOTUSblog, The Volokh Conspiracy, Balkinization, PrawfsBlawg, 
LawProfessorBlogs, and Concurring Opinions, among others. 
As Paul Clement noted in his foreword to A Conspiracy Against 
Obamacare: “[I]f ever a legal blog and a constitutional moment were 
meant for each other, it was the Volokh Conspiracy and the challenge to 
the Aff ordable Care Act.”44 What do you make of this development? 
Do you think it deserves the title of “legal scholarship”?
Edwards: If blogs are taken for what they really are—news reports 
and commentaries—then they have the potential to be interesting and 
useful. They provide services formerly off ered by newspapers, namely, 
reporting the news and publishing editorial comments. Blogs certainly 
do not replace good scholarship found in law reviews. 
41. The Growing Disjunction, supra note 9, at 43. 
42. LAW BOOKS IN ACTION 20-21 (2012).
43. Id. at 295. 
44. A CONSPIRACY AGAINST OBAMACARE: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY AND THE AFFORDABLE CARE 
ACT viii (Trevor Burrus ed., 2014). 
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The worry that I have with law blogs (as with many Internet 
sites that purport to report and comment on the news) is that they 
sometimes report and comment too quickly on judicial decisions. 
As a result, blogs do not always capture the important nuances of an 
opinion or the precedent that underlies the decision. The best way to 
understand an opinion is to read it.
Collins: Apart from the Michigan Law Review’s annual book review issue, 
many law reviews have ceased to publish book review essays. What are 
your views concerning this brand of legal scholarship? 
Edwards: In my view, a good book review is a great brand of legal 
scholarship. The truth is that most books on the law do not garner 
wide readership. Book reviews usefully call attention to books that 
ought to command interest. Good book reviews also helpfully amplify 
and critique theories, policies, and practices that are the subject of the 
books being reviewed. In other words, a review gives readers some 
context. Even when a review takes issue with the author of the book, 
the reader invariably learns about matters that were formerly unknown 
or not well understood.
Collins: In retrospect, are there any aspects of your extensive 
scholarship about which you now have serious misgivings? Have you 
changed your mind on anything in any signifi cant way? 
Edwards: Not really. I do not mean to suggest that my views always 
have been on the mark or that everything that I have written has been 
salutary. Quite the contrary. I have learned a lot over the years as I 
have probed diff erent areas of interest. I would like to think that my 
intellectual interests and capacities have continued to grow. 
In my early years in the profession, I could not have written about 
some of the matters that have been of great interest to me during the 
past decade because I had neither the experience nor the insights that 
come from experience to tackle the issues. Some subjects that come 
to mind include race and the law, empirical legal studies, judicial 
collegiality, and the use of forensic disciplines in the law. 
Collins: Have you ever considered writing a memoir of your many 
years in the law? 
Edwards: I have thought about it, but it seems a bit pretentious. I 
do not think that there is anything more that I need to say beyond 
what I have published in my legal scholarship, speeches, and judicial 
opinions.

The Editors of the Journal of Legal Education thank Judge Edwards for fi rst agreeing 
to be interviewed, and for taking the time to answer our questions.
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Books, Articles, Essays, Tributes, Remembrances,
Speeches & Student Notes
by Harry T. Edwards
Books
1. & LINDA A. ELLIOTT &, FEDERAL COURTS—STANDARDS OF REVIEW: AP-
PELLATE COURT REVIEW OF DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS AND AGENCY 
ACTIONS (2nd ed. 2013) 
2. & R. THEODORE CLARK, LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: 
CASES & MATERIALS (1991)
3. & VIRGINIA D. NORDIN, HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE LAW (Institute 
for Educational Management, Harvard Univ., 1979 & Supps., 1980-
1983)
4. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND LABOR ARBITRATION (1980)
5. HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE LAW (1979)
6. & JAMES J. WHITE, THE LAWYER AS A NEGOTIATOR: PROBLEMS, READ-
INGS & MATERIALS (1976)
See also: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM: A SUPPLEMENT 
TO HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE LAW (1980) (65 pp.)
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(2014)
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3. Tribute to Hon. Patricia M. Wald, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 1 (2010-
2011)
4. The National Academy of Sciences Report on Forensic Sciences: What It Means for the 
Bench and Bar, 51 JURIMETRICS J. 1 (2010)
5. Solving the Problems That Plague the Forensic Science Community, 50 JURIMET-
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6. & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies That Attempt to Under-
stand the Factors Aff ecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895 (2009)
7. Renewing Our Commitment to the Highest Ideals of the Legal Profession, 84 N.C. 
L. REV. 1421 (2006) 
8. Professor Yale Kasimar: Awesome, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1677 (2004)
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From Racial Assimilation to Diversity, 102 MICH. L. REV. 944 (2004)
10. The Eff ects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639 
(2003) 
11. The Good and Bad of Legal Education in the United States, Presentation to 
Faculty and Graduate Students at the University of Tokyo (Oct. 10, 
2001), 5 CAUSA 54 (2003)
12. Defi ning Characteristics of Federal Courts in the United States: The System of Justice 
Below the Supreme Court, Presentation to Japanese American Society for Legal 
Studies, Tokyo University, Japan (Oct. 13, 2001), 2002 AMERIKA HO 58
13. & Linda Elliott, Beware of Numbers (and Unsupported Claims of Judicial Bias), 
80 WASH. U. L. Q. 723 (2002)
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18. Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. REV. 1335 (1998)
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21. A Tribute to My Friend, the Honorable Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 1997 ANN. SURV. 
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23. A New Vision for the Legal Profession, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 567 (1997) 
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25. Refl ections on Education at the ILR School, circa 1958-1962, in CORNELL UNI-
VERSITY ILR SCHOOL, THE ILR SCHOOL AT FIFTY: VOICES OF THE FACULTY, 
ALUMNI & FRIENDS 70 (Elaine Goldberg ed., 1996)
26. To Err Is Human, But Not Always Harmless: When Should Legal Error Be Toler-
ated? 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1167 (1995)
27. & Mitchell N. Berman, Regulating Violence on Television, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 
1487 (1994-1995)
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29. Another “Postscript” to “The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the 
Legal Profession,” 69 WASH. L. REV. 561 (1994)
30. Personal Refl ections on 30 Years of Legal Education for Minorities, 37 MICH. L. 
QUADRANGLE NOTES 38 (1994)
31. The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession: A Post-
script, 91 MICH. L. REV. 2191 (1993)
32. & James B. Speta, “Our Federalism:” Doctrines of Legislative and Judicial Feder-
alism in the United States (Comparative Lessons for “Subsidiarity” in the 
European Community?) (Mentor Group Working Paper, 1993)
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41. The Future of Affi  rmative Action in Employment, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 763 
(1987)
42. Agonizing Over the Simple Realities of Labor Relations, in THE FUTURE OF IN-
DUSTRIAL RELATIONS 162 (Daniel J. B. Mitchell ed., UCLA Institute of 
Industrial Relations, Monograph and Research Series: 47, 1987)
43. Justice Black and Labor Law: Some Refl ections on the Justice’s Jurisprudence of In-
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(1987)
44. & Walter Gelhorn, et al., Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution in Govern-
ment: A Sense of Perspective, 1 ADMIN L. J. 459 (1987)
45. Wade H. McCree Jr.: A Model of Excellence, 86 MICH. L. REV. 227 (1987)
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